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AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW LOUISIANA CODE OF
EVIDENCE-ITS IMPERFECTIONS AND
UNCERTAINTIES
Gerard A. Rault, Jr.*
After many decades of controversial efforts and aborted attempts
to codify Louisiana's evidence law, the state finally has a comprehensive
Code. The Louisiana Code of Evidence, 2 generally applicable in both
civil and criminal cases, became effective on January 1, 1989. 3
The road toward codification has been long and rocky. That road
may be said to have begun in 1805, when Louisiana enacted the Crimes
Act, 4 officially introducing common law evidentiary rules in specified
criminal prosecutions.5 Within six years appellate courts were considering
common law evidentiary principles in civil cases,6 and in 1819 the Louis-
iana Supreme Court held that Spanish evidentiary rules had been ab-
rogated by common consent and that common law evidence would
thereafter apply.7 Three years later, in 1822, the first attempt to codify
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw.
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School; Co-Reporter, Code of Evidence Project,
Louisiana State Law Institute.
1. The history of attempted codification of Louisiana evidence law, as well as that
of national codification efforts, is outlined in Pugh, Federal Rules of Evidence: Foreword,
36 La. L. Rev. 59 (1975) [hereinafter Pugh, Federal Rules], reprinted in G. Pugh, Louisiana
Evidence Law 2 (Supp. 1978); Sanders, A Code of Evidence for Louisiana-An Idea
Whose Time Has Come?, 13 S.U.L. Rev. 201 (1987).
2. 1988 La. Acts No. 515.
3. Under article 1101(A), the provisions of the Code are generally "applicable to
the determination of questions of fact in all contradictory judicial proceedings and in
proceedings to confirm a default." Under section 12 of Act 515, the Code took effect
on January 1, 1989, and applies to proceedings brought or initiated on or after that date.
The Code also applies on that date to actions and proceedings then pending except to
the extent that application of the rules would not be feasible or would work injustice,
in which event former evidentiary principles apply.
4. 1804 La. Acts ch. 50, p. 416. Between Louisiana's accession into the United
States in 1803 and the creation of laws abrogating the status quo ante, Spanish law
obtained. See Comment, Were the Louisiana Rules of Civil Evidence Affected by the
Adoption of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure?, 14 La. L. Rev. 568 (1954). It
is not clear that Spanish evidentiary principles were any more than theoretically extant
or applicable. Id.
5. See 1804 La. Acts ch. 50, § 33, p. 440; Comment, supra note 4.
6. Durnford v. Clark, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 202 (La. 1811), cited in Comment, supra note
4, at 569 n.8.
7. Planters Bank v. George, 6 Mart. (o.s.) 670 (La. 1819).
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Louisiana's common law of evidence was initiated when the Louisiana
legislature appointed Edward Livingston to prepare a penal code for
the state.8 Although part of an effort to systemize only the criminal
law, the code of evidence that Livingston produced applied to both
criminal and civil cases. In part because the entire penal code proved
controversial, 9 the legislature never adopted Livingston's code of evi-
dence. Each subsequent attempt at codification, including the most recent
and successful one, has likewise been steeped in controversy.
During the more than century and a half since the rejection of
Livingston's evidence code, Louisiana courts have continued to follow
the general common law of evidence in both civil and criminal cases.
In a variety of particulars, common law rules were set out in statutes,
sometimes with legislative modifications. Many of the common law rules
came into our law in the Acts of 1928, now found in Title 15 of the
Revised Statutes, but others were placed in the Civil Code, the Code
of Civil Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure, other codes, and
diverse titles of the Revised Statutes. In large measure, however, answers
to evidentiary questions, to the extent that there were answers, could
be found only in judicial decisions.
By the middle of this century Louisiana evidence law had become
notoriously murky and uncertain. This was particularly true in civil
matters, where trial courts tended to apply both general common law
principles and, by loose analogy, the criminal evidentiary rules in Title
15. Almost invariably these courts let the objection "go to the weight"
rather than to the issue of admissibility. Due to the "harmless error"
rule, appellate courts rarely had occasion to analyze evidentiary issues
closely or to pronounce the law with care.
This confusion in the law led to a second attempt at codification
in 1956. In that year the legislature commissioned the Louisiana State
Law Institute to prepare a code of evidence. 0 Again the effort proved
controversial." After some ten years of effort the Institute abandoned
the project, in part because the contending forces simply could not agree
8. Act of March 21, 1822. See Pugh, Federal Rules, supra note 1; Sanders, supra
note 1. This movement toward codification was motivated in part by the writings of
Jeremy Bentham, and particularly his Theory of Judicial Evidence, published in French
in 1818. In his report to the Louisiana Legislature Livingston acknowledged the leadership
of his English counterpart. See Pugh, Federal Rules, supra note 1, at 60 n.6.
9. Moore, The Livingston Code, 19 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 344, 354 (1928),
cited in Pugh, Federal Rules, supra note 1, at 60-61 n.8.
10. 1956 La. Acts No. 87.
11. Dean Antonio Papale of the Loyola Law School served as Reporter for the Law
Institute project. He reviews issues and recounts some of the problems in Papale, Editorial:
Reflections on the Proposed Louisiana Code of Evidence, 12 Loy. L. Rev. 51 (1965).
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and in part because it appeared that a federal code of evidence might
soon be forthcoming.' 2
The project leading to the new Code began in 1979, when the
Louisiana Legislature again directed'" the preparation of a code of
evidence.14 The three Law Institute Reporters analyzed the relevant issues
and meticulously examined the existing Louisiana law. The Reporters
then compared federal law, the law of all other states, model rules and,
on occasion, the laws of other countries. An Advisory Committee com-
posed of outstanding practitioners, judges, and law professors reviewed
the Reporters' work product. After much scholarly and practical debate,
the Advisory Committee made a number of additions, deletions, and
modifications. The resulting draft then went to the Council of the Law
Institute, where it was again thoroughly reviewed and debated.' 5
The resulting Proposed Louisiana Code of Evidence was published
and submitted to the legislature in 1986. 16 But, predictably, the Proposed
Code proved controversial. What the plaintiffs' bar liked, the defense
bar disliked. What prosecutors abhorred, criminal defense lawyers ap-
plauded. This was, of course, exactly what happened with the Livingston
code of the 1820s and the Law Institute code of the 1950s. The Proposed
Code did not come out of committee in the 1986 legislature. In the
1987 session, another stalemate blocked the adoption of the Code.
A similar fate may have awaited the Proposed Code in the 1988
legislative session, but, on the evening before it was to be considered
by Senate Committee, the opposing factions held a last-minute com-
promise session.'7 The various interested groups confected a compromise
and, after the addition of numerous amendments, the Louisiana Code
of Evidence was enacted. Like most products of compromise, however,
some aspects of the new Code are awkward or imperfect.
This article offers a chapter by chapter overview of the new Code
with particular focus on those articles that effect substantial changes in
12. Sponsler, Evidence: Louisiana Style, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 273, 274 (1975). It would
seem that controversy and failure to reach a consensus were the primary reasons for the
project's failure, for there was no shortage of models. See, e.g., Model Code of Evidence
(1942); Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953).
13. La. H.R. Con. Res. 250, Reg. Sess. (1979).
14. The 1979 resolution commissioned the Louisiana Judicial College with the task,
but the Louisiana State Law Institute actually undertook the project. Professor George
Pugh of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center was named Co-Reporter and Coordinator of
Reporters, and Professor Robert Force of the Tulane Law School and I were named Co-
Reporters. Mr. Kerry Triche of the Law Institute served as Director of Research for the
project.
15. The process is explained in greater detail in Pugh, Force, Rault and Triche, The
Louisiana Code of Evidence-A Retrospective and Prospective View, 49 La. L. Rev. 565
(1988).
16. La. H.R. 1155, Reg. Sess. (1986).
17. See Pugh, Force, Rault and Triche, supra note 15.
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former Louisiana law or that seem to raise uncertainties for practitioners
and judges. 8
Chapter One-General Provisions
The first chapter of the Code deals primarily with procedural matters.
Article 101 sets out the scope of the Code, stating the general rule that
the Code governs all proceedings in Louisiana courts. The article refers
the reader to article 1101, which offers more detailed rules on the
applicability of the Code. The general thrust of article 1101 is that,
subject to several exceptions, the Code applies to "the determination
of questions of fact in all contradictory judicial proceedings.' 19
The purpose of the Code and the rule of construction is placed in
article 102, which is phrased in general terms and offers the broad aims
of the Code. Although it is an abridgement of the federal source
provision, the change effected no significant divergence from the cor-
responding Federal Rule in policy or results.
Article 103 codifies principles regarding rulings on evidence that are
already familiar to the Louisiana practitioner. For example, the require-
ment that an erroneous ruling effect "a substantial right of a party"
before a reversal is proper in effect codifies the "harmless error" rule
of Louisiana law. Likewise, the requirement of a timely and specific
objection or motion to admonish the jury to disregard is not new to
our courts; 20 nor are provisions allowing the judge to make a per curiam
explanation, 2' or to require that discussions or arguments on objections
generally be held out of the hearing of the jury.22
Prosecutors had several objections to the article as originally offered
by the Law Institute, and the version adopted reflects several amendments
to that original proposal. At the behest of the Louisiana District At-
torney's Association (LDAA) the phrase "motion to admonish the jury"
was substituted for the phrase "motion to strike." The concern was
that the original language created a new and unprecedented motion for
Louisiana, and that its effect was uncertain. It is believed, however,
that the terms are interchangeable, and that the debate on this issue
was one of semantics. When the court grants a motion to strike, the
court reporter does not actually tear up or erase that portion of the
18. See generally Triche, Overview of the New Louisiana Code of Evidence: Part 1,
36 La. B.J. 76 (Aug. 1988). No slavish attempt has been made at uniformity or thor-
oughness of treatment, and not all of the articles nor even the trouble-spots of the new
Code are here addressed.
19. La. Code Evid. art. 1101(A). See infra text accompanying note 220.
20. La. Code Evid. art. 103(A)(1).
21. Id. art. 103(B).
22. Id. art. 103(C).
[Vol. 49
NEW LOUISIANA CODE OF EVIDENCE
record. Rather, the jury is instructed constructively to strike the testimony
from their minds. The motion to strike is the same as a motion to
admonish the jury to disregard. 23 In any event, the substitution of the
latter phrase for the original language caused no serious harm.
The LDAA also objected to the provision of the Proposed Code
that required a specific ground of the objection "if the specific ground
was not apparent from the context .... ,,;24 in effect, this provision
would have allowed appeal on objections for which no ground was
stated so long as the ground for the objection was obvious. By Senate
Committee amendment this phrase was deleted. The LDAA was correct
in its argument that the proposal would change Louisiana law, 2 but its
elimination seems unfortunate. Under former law, as under this article,
no error may be appealed successfully unless the objecting party artic-
ulated the proper specific ground for the objection at trial. It will not
matter, for example, that the judge ruled so quickly as to cut off the
objecting party, or that the ground for objection was not stated because
it was so patently obvious from the context or the question asked. This
constitutes a trap for the unwary and inexperienced, which the law of
evidence ought not encourage.
Prosecutors did not stand alone in their criticism of the Proposed
Code. Criminal defense lawyers complained that the new Code did not
include a provision parallel to Federal Rule 103(d)26 embracing a "plain
error" provision. The Law Institute omitted the Federal provision from
the Proposed Code because, whatever its merits, it was an appellate
procedural statute rather than a purely evidentiary one and thus arguably
exceeded the Law Institute's mandate from the legislature. In any event,
Louisiana will continue to follow the rule that absent objection and
briefing on appeal, the appellate courts will assess only errors "discov-
erable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings" in criminal
matters .27
Article 104 deals with preliminary questions and aroused relatively
little controversy. The criminal defense bar did raise the point that article
104(A), addressing questions of admissibility generally, and 104(B), deal-
ing with relevancy conditioned on fact, could be used to eviscerate State
23. See Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 103 comment (d).
24. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 103(A)(l).
25. See id. art. 103 comment (e).
26. Fed. R. Evid. 103(d).
27. La. Code Crim. P. art. 920.
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v. Davis. 2 This realization and a review of the federal case law29 led
to the last-minute creation of article 1103. While inartfully phrased, that
article seems to have accomplished its purpose of retaining the judge-
made protections of the Davis case, and thus avoiding the possible
application of article 104(B) to "K.I.S." evidence.
Article 105, on limited admissibility, differs from the Law Institute
proposal and modifies prior Louisiana law. It mandates that the court,
upon request, shall restrict evidence to its proper scope and so instruct
the jury. Although the article does not address the point, it seems clear
that the court retains the authority to take these sorts of protective
measures even absent request.30
The first chapter of the Proposed Code contained one additional
provision, article 106. The proposed provision mandated that when a
party introduced all or part of a photograph, writing, or recording, "an
adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part
or any other photograph, writing, or recording which ought in fairness
to be considered contemporaneously with it."'" The Institute agreed to
delete the article at the insistence of the LDAA, which feared that this
specification of the familiar "rule of completeness" might go too far
in affording the adversary control over a party's presentation of evidence.
It is believed, however, that notwithstanding the deletion of the proposed
article, a similar effect can be reached under other provisions.3 2
Chapter Two-Judicial Notice
The Code's second chapter collects, streamlines, and clarifies Louis-
iana's law of judicial notice. Judicial notice of facts is dealt with in
article 201, and judicial notice of laws is treated in article 202.
Article 201 applies only to "adjudicative" facts. A fact is adjudi-
cative when it is directly involved in the solution of the particular dispute
before the tribunal and is of the sort normally determined by the trier
28. 449 So. 2d 466 (La. 1984). Davis held that the accused's commission of "other
crimes" must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to make them
admissible to prove knowledge, intent, or system. See La. Code Evid. art. 404(B)(1); La.
R.S. 15:445-46, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515. The "knowledge, intent, system"
formulation is commonly denoted "K.I.S."
29. See Huddleston v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1496 (1988) and United States v.
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S. Ct. 1244 (1979),
holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b), rather than a "clear and convincing"
standard, governs the court's determination whether the defendant committed "K.I.S."
crimes to be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
30. See La. Code Evid. art. 611(A); State v. Tucker, 354 So. 2d 521 (La. 1978).
31. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 106.
32. See, e.g., La. Code Evid. arts. 403, 611(A).
[Vol. 49
NEW LOUISIANA CODE OF EVIDENCE
of fact.3 The article generally follows the corresponding federal provision
and defines a fact subject to judicial notice as "one not subject to
reasonable dispute ' 3 4 either because it is "generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court"3 5 or because it is "capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned. 3 6
As originally submitted by the Institute, paragraph (G) of article
201 provided that in all civil cases and in criminal cases when the
accused requested it, the court should instruct the jury to accept as
conclusive the fact judicially noticed; but if the accused did not request
the instruction, the court should instruct the jury that it may, but need
not, accept the fact.3 7 Although this seemed to the Institute to afford
the accused greater protection against jury abuse,3" the provision was
amended at the demand of the LDAA. Under the article as amended,
the criminal case jury always retains discretion to disregard judicially
noticed facts.3 9
The greatest utility of article 202, on judicial notice of legal matters,
is that it brings together and clarifies diverse general provisions previously
scattered throughout the Revised Statutes. 4° The article slightly alters
prior law in two ways. First, it requires a court to take judicial notice
of ordinances enacted by parishes and municipalities within its territorial
jurisdiction when the proponent has filed certified copies of the ordinance
with the clerk of court.4 1 Second, it permits judicial notice of the official
rulings and regulations of administrative boards and agencies.4 2 Although
33. Compare, "legislative" facts, which are the sort used by courts "to determine
law, to declare policy, or to exercise discretion." J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence, 201[02], at 201-21 (1988). See also La. Code Evid. art. 201 comment (b).
34. La. Code Evid. art. 201(B).
35. Id. art. 201(B)(1).
36. Id. art. 201(B)(2)., At first blush this provision seems to create, in effect, an
exception to the hearsay exclusion not necessarily recognized by article 803 or 804. The
better approach, however, is to recognize that the court determines the factual preconditions
of article 201 under article 104(A), and is thus not bound by the usual rules excluding
hearsay. The sources on which the court relies will not formally be admitted into evidence,
although a record of them should be made to facilitate judicial review on appeal.
37. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 201(G).
38. See id. art. 201 comment (f).
39. La. Code Evid. art 201(G).
40. See, e.g., La. R.S. 15:422, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8; La. R.S.
13:3712, amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 575, § 6. Judicial notice provisions addressing
highly specialized topics will remain where previously found. See, e.g., La. R.S. 3:3225
(1987) (state chemist's reports); La. R.S. 17:2084 (1982) (Xavier University); La. R.S.
32:1473 (Supp. 1988) (certified traffic conviction record); La. R.S. 44:367 (1982) (certified
copy from re-established archive). See La. Code Evid. art. 202 comment (f).
41. La. Code Evid. art. 202(A). See also id. art. 202 comment (b).
42. Id. art. 202(B)(l)(d). See also id. art. 202 comment (b).
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the provision requiring notice to all parties is included as a subparagraph
of paragraph (B)'4 it would seem to have been intended to apply to
all instances of judicial notice under this article. 44
Chapter Three-Presumptions and Burdens of Proof
Chapter three was intentionally omitted from the first stage of the
Institute's codification effort. One reason for this was that while the
Institute had been directed generally to follow the federal mode, the
corresponding chapters of the Federal Rules of Evidence do not go into
any depth. Moreover, the controversial and divisive topics of those
chapters would have further slowed the codification effort. Hence, the
Institute deferred codification of these areas until the second stage of
the evidence project, which is now underway. Until the current work
of the Institute is completed and enacted, existing statutes and case law
will continue to govern issues of presumptions and burdens of proof.
45
Chapter Four-Relevancy and Its Limits
Chapter Four is probably the most important chapter in the Code.
In particular, articles 401 through 403 form the theoretical cornerstone
of the Code and are the foundation upon which other provisions depend.
Article 401 defines relevancy in a purely logical-and, if it stood
alone, an impractical-manner:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.46
The term "any tendency" should be stressed, for under this definition
evidence may be marginally relevant as an abstract matter even though
it is of so little probative weight that no one would consider it mean-
ingfully helpful. Thus, in an intersectional collision action for damages
allegedly caused by defendant's speeding, evidence that defendant was
seen slightly speeding some ten years earlier would be "relevant" under
this definition. Likewise, evidence that the accused in a rape trial had
subscribed to Playboy magazine several years before the crime would
be "relevant," for this article deals only with what has been called
43. Id. art. 202(B)(2).
44. Certainly, for example, the opponent should be afforded an opportunity to confirm
the accuracy of the purported text of a Guam statute or of a parish ordinance noticed
under article 202(A). See also id. art. 611(A).
45. See, e.g., on presumptions, La. Civ. Code arts. 1849-52; La. R.S. 15:432-33
(1981); on burdens of proof, La. Code Civ. P. art. 2903, La. Code Crim. P. art. 804.
46. La. Code Evid. art. 401.
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logical relevancy. This "logical relevancy' 47 definition contained in article
401 operates in tandem with article 403 "legal relevancy ' 48 to give a
practical relevancy rule.
Article 402 states the most important general rule of admissibility
in the Code, the rule of presumptive admissibility of relevant evidence.
Under this rule, all relevant evidence (as defined in article 401) is
admissible except as otherwise provided.4 9 Many of the remaining articles
of the Code create the exceptions to article 402.
Article 403 contains the first exception to the rule of presumptive
admissibility. This article articulates a balancing test already familiar to
most Louisiana practitioners:50
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or waste of time:5"
As used in this balancing test, "unfair prejudice" does not refer to
mere damage, however great, to the opponent's case, but rather to the
creation of a tendency or temptation for the jury to decide the case on
some illicit ground such as prejudice, emotion, hostility, or sympathy.5 2
This article differs from the proposed article and the federal source
provision only by the deletion of the language "or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence" from the end of the sentence. The LDAA,
concerned that this phrase gave trial courts too much discretion to limit
the state's case, insisted on the deletion. It would seem, however, that
the deletion brought about no substantial change. For similar results
can be reached, if warranted, by reliance on the avoidance of "undue
delay, or waste of time." 53 The Law Institute proposal had substituted
the word "shall" for the federal "may" in the term "may be excluded"
in the belief that if the probative value was "substantially outweighed"
by one or more of the offsetting risks the evidence must be excluded.5 4
47. See C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 185 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
48. Article 403 deals with what has been called "legal relevancy" by requiring, for
admissibility, a balance of the weight of the relevancy (probative value) against various
off-setting risks. Article 403 would make the evidence in the two hypothetical situations
discussed above in text inadmissible. See also La. Code Evid. art. 404.
49. La. Code Evid. art. 402. When doubt arises about the admissibility of any
evidence, this general rule provides a useful starting point for analysis.
50. See, e.g., State v. Ludwig, 423 So. 2d 1073 (La. 1982); State v. Moore, 278 So.
2d 781 (La. 1972).
51. La. Code Evid. art. 403.
52. See C. McCormick, supra note 47, § 185, at 545, Sanders, supra note 1, at 205.
On the possibility of unfair surprise constituting "unfair prejudice," see State v. Ludwig,
423 So. 2d 1073, 1079 (La. 1983); Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 403 comment (g).
53. See also La. Code Evid. art. 611(A).
54. See Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 403 comment (d).
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The return to the federal phrase was effected by Senate Committee
amendment. It is to be hoped that, as has been the case in the federal
system, the use of "may" will not prove significant.
The importance of this article should not be underestimated. First,
it operates as the initial sieve through which evidence found relevant
under article 401 must pass to be admissible. Second, article 403 serves
as a restraint on the abuse or misuse of other provisions in the Code.
For example, although article 404(A)(1) generally permits the criminally
accused to offer testimony on his good community reputation in order
to show a character trait pertinent to the crime charged, article 403
could be employed to prevent him from calling twenty different witnesses
for that purpose.5 The article 403 rule has this same residual effect in
the operation of many other articles.
Many articles, of course, reflect by word or tenor that the legislature
itself has made the primary balance. 6 Articles 404 through 412 address
frequently recurring issues upon which the legislature has specified ad-
missibility or inadmissibility of stated evidence for certain purposes.
Where these articles apply, no primary or general "403-balance" by the
courts is appropriate. It is important to recognize, however, that although
most of these articles make certain evidence inadmissible for the purpose
specified, it may be admissible for a distinct purpose. Sometimes the
same evidence has dual relevance in that it raises two distinct lines of
inferences. 5 7
Article 404 and 405 deal with character evidence, that is, evidence
about what kind of person someone is8 Article 404 renders character
evidence generally inadmissible, but certain parties can introduce char-
acter evidence for certain purposes. 9 For example, the criminally accused
55. See also La. Code Evid. art. 611(A).
56. See, e.g., La. Code Evid. arts. 404, 412, 608(B), 609, and 609.1. Even in the
application of these articles, of course, article 403 might be employed to prevent many
witnesses from testifying to the same thing or similar abuses.
57. Where the accused is charged with a burglary, for example, evidence that he
committed an earlier uncharged burglary is specific act character evidence and is inad-
missible. La. Code Evid. art. 404(A). If, however, a spare key to the apartment was
stolen in the prior burglary and used in the more recent one, evidence that the accused
committed the earlier burglary has a line of relevancy separate and apart from the
prohibited character evidence inference, and may be admissible. Id. art. 404(B). In such
instances of dual relevancy the trial court must perform a balancing assessment akin to
that articulated in article 403. Now the issue is whether, comparing the probative value
of each line of relevancy, the jury realistically may be expected to follow a cautionary
instruction under article 105 to consider only the permissible line of relevancy while
ignoring the prohibited use.
58. See C. McCormick, supra note 47, § 195, at 574.
59. La. Code Evid. art. 404(A) (lists exceptions to the general rule of the inadmissibility
of circumstantial character evidence).
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may offer reputation testimony, after proper foundation,60 on a pertinent
trait.6 Should the accused exercise this option, the prosecution may
respond in kind. 62 The prosecution may itself offer character evidence
in certain narrow circumstances. In homicide cases the prosecution is
allowed to introduce evidence regarding the victim's reputation for peace-
fulness in order to rebut the accused's evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor. 63 Article 404(B) embodies the "knowledge-intent-system"
concept. 64 The article reflects the recognition that "other crime" evidence
may have independent relevance apart from the prohibited character use
and may be admissible for the independent purpose. 6
There is an important but unarticulated distinction between the direct
use of character evidence and its circumstantial use. Character evidence
may occasionally be used directly (such as where character or a trait
of character is itself a relevant issue in the case). 66 When it is used
directly, it is admissible so long as it is relevant and does not run afoul
of any other prohibition. More often, though, the evidence is used
circumstantially to raise the inference that on a particular occasion the
person acted in conformity with his character or a trait of his character. 67
It is the circumstantial use of character evidence that article 404 ad-
dresses.
While article 404 determines when character evidence is admissible,
article 405 controls the type of character evidence that may be used.
The structure of article 405 shows that the type of character evidence
permitted depends on whether the character evidence is used directly or
circumstantially. Article 405(A) generally provides that when article 404
permits the circumstantial use of character evidence, only evidence of
reputation is permissible. But when character evidence is used directly,
article 405(B) authorizes evidence of both reputation and specific acts. 6
60. Id. art. 405(C).
61. Id. art. 404(A)(1).
62. Id.
63. Id. art. 404(A)(2)(b). The defendant's evidence need not be character evidence.
This changes former Louisiana law by following the corresponding federal provision.
64. See former La. R.S. 15:445-46, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8; State
v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983); State v. Humphrey, 412 So. 2d 507, 520 (La. 1982)
(on rehearing).
65. There are three possible means of proving character: general reputation, individual
opinion, and specific instances of conduct.
66. This use is alluded to in article 405(B). When plaintiff sues for defamation alleging
that defendant called him a thief and defendant admits the statement but defends on the
ground that his statement was true, whether plaintiff is a thief is directly at issue in the
lawsuit. See C. McCormick, supra note 47, § 187.
67. This use is governed by article 404(A).
68. La. Code Evid. art. 405(B). This is quite rare. See supra note 66; La. Code
Evid. art. 405 comment (e).
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As enacted, article 404 differs substantially from the original Law
Institute proposals, 69 and sometimes in a troubling manner. First, article
404(A)(2) and (B)(2) add to the original proposal a "battered woman" 70
proviso, which eases the burden of any qualifying accused who can
show a "history of assaultive behavior" 7' vis-a-vis the victim. Unlike
other accuseds, the defendant who can qualify under this provision and
who alleges self-defense need not first offer evidence of "a hostile
demonstration or overt act" 72 before introducing evidence of the victim's
dangerous character and prior specific acts of violence. 73 It might have
been reasonable to delete entirely the "hostile demonstration or overt
act" requirement, 74 but it is not clear why it is reasonable to exempt
only one class of accuseds. 75 The added proviso further stipulates that
"an expert's opinion as to the effects of the prior assaultive acts on
the accused's state of mind is admissible. ' 76 The unqualified language
69. See Proposed La. Code Evid. arts. 404-05. There are several differences, only a
few of which are here discussed. Others, such as the inartful redundancy ("pertinent trait
• . . qualities pertinent") of article 404(A)(1) should not give rise to problems of inter-
pretation or application.
70. Although I here employ the popular term, in fact the addition is applicable to
any accused who lived in a "familial or intimate relationship" with the victim. The
examples of "husband-wife, parent-child, or concubinage" are illustrative. See La. Code
Evid. art. 404(A)(2) and (B)(2).
71. This term is nowhere defined. Technically, one prior act ,of "assaultive behavior"
might constitute a "history." A fuller definition of the term must await judicial imple-
mentation. This preliminary fact is to be determined by the court without the usual
evidentiary restrictions. La. Code Evid. art. 104(A). It would seem possible, under article
104(C), for the accused to testify on this issue out of the hearing of the jury.
72. La. Code Evid. art. 404(A)(2) and (B). See La. R.S. 15:482, repealed by 1988
La. Acts No. 515, § 8.
73. La. Code Evid. art. 404(A)(2) and (B). The admissibility of specific acts of
violence for the purpose of proving a violent character is a change from both former
Louisiana laws and the corresponding federal provision. See Fed. R. Evid. 405(a).
74. That option was seriously considered in the drafting of the Law Institute's
proposed Code. It ultimately was decided that elimination of the requirement was not
only politically infeasible but that the clause served a salutary purpose of preventing an
accused from besmirching the reputation of the victim without offering any evidence
whatever of an actual attack by him.
75. In homicide cases, for the accused to prevail on a self-defense theory there must
be evidence suggesting that the defendant reasonably believed himself to be in "imminent
danger" of death or great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:20 (1986). Typically, that evidence
will also constitute the evidence of the "hostile demonstration or overt act." The argument
in favor of special treatment is based on what has come to be called the "battered wife
syndrome," a reference to the special mental state of those who acted to defend themselves
when they knew well from repeated experiences that a beating was in the offing but, in
retrospect, can not easily show that the beating was "imminent" without resort to evidence
of the victim's prior assaultive patterns. See generally, W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal
Law § 5.7(d) (2d ed. 1986).
76. La. Code Evid. art. 404(A)(2) and (B). See also, Comment, Battered Women
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suggesting admissibility is unfortunate, for in some instances the state
of mind testified to by the expert will not be relevant under the bounds
of substantive law. Perhaps this final proviso should be read as au-
thorizing otherwise relevant expert testimony. 77
A second addition to the Law Institute's proposed Code is the final
clause of the "K.I.S." provisions contained in article 404(B)(1). This
rule permits evidence of other crimes or wrongs "when it relates to
conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that
is the subject of the present proceeding." This is an articulation of the
familiar if uncertain Latin phrase res gestae. The redactors had hoped
to keep this obfuscating anachronism78 out of the Code altogether,
79
even in English explication. However, it seems to do relatively little
harm here. 80
Besides the two additions to article 404,"there is one significant
deletion. Article 404 as proposed by the Law Institute contained a
paragraph (C), which codified the procedural safeguards of State v.
Prieur,8' State v. Davis,8 2 and State v. Moore.83 These cases provide
that when the state intends under the "K.I.S." rule to offer evidence
of the accused's other uncharged crimes, it must give advance notice
and Self-Defense: Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome
in Virginia, 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 171 (1987).
77. As these provisions are lodged in the Chapter on relevancy, there seems no intent
to loosen the independent requirements as to first hand knowledge, article 602, expert
testimony, articles 702-06, hearsay, articles 801-06, and the like.
78. Professor George Pugh of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center faculty, who led the
Law Institute's codification project, is fond of saying to students and anyone else who
will listen that res gestae is Latin for "let it in." In fact, of course, it means "thing
done," but his version is not only funnier but is in fact a better guide to how the term
traditionally has been applied by Louisiana courts.
79. It seems clear that the Latin term has served as a substitute for analysis. The
concept is both a specification of relevancy principles-that all portions of the act or
transaction being litigated which are necessary or helpful to a full appreciation of the
event are admissible-and a fuzzy label for several hearsay exceptions. The Reporters had
hoped that articles 401 through 403 and 803(1), (2), and (3) would have made even
indirect references to the "res gestae" unnecessary, as in the federal system, and thus
permitted this overworked ghost to take its well deserved rest.
80. But see La. Code Evid. art. 801(D)(4), discussed at infra text accompanying notes
186-87. In the article 404(B)(1) formulation the key word is "integral." It must be
interpreted in light of article 403. In a prosecution for armed robbery, for example,
evidence that the accused slapped the victim is an "integral" part of the act for, although
it constitutes a separate crime, it shows the force or intimidation necessary for robbery.
Evidence that at the time of the incident the accused had pornographic photos of young
children in his wallet is not "integral" and is inadmissible. See generally, C. McCormick,
supra note 47, § 190.
81. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973) (on rehearing).
82. 449 So. 2d 466 (La. 1984).
83. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
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to the defense, and must satisfy the court prior to trial both that the
evidence is not a subterfuge for illustrating bad propensity and that
clear and convincing evidence will show that the accused committed the
other crimes.14
The LDAA successfully argued that these judicially created safe-
guards should not be made part of the new Code. Upon their deletion,
however, a problem existed. Evidence of other crimes becomes relevant
only if the accused committed those crimes; hence the court would
decide this preliminary question of conditional relevance under the rule
of article 104(B). Under that rule, the evidence of other crimes would
be admissible if there was "evidence sufficient to support a finding"
that the accused committed them. Although this rule could be read to
dilute the "clear and convincing" standard, there was no intent to affect
that standard nor any of the other judicially created protections. At the
last minute, therefore, the contending forces confected the hastily drawn
article 1103. Although its reference to article 104(A) rather than 104(B)
seems erroneous,85 the title of the article makes its intent crystal clear:
these important jurisprudential protections of the criminally accused,
while not codified, are preserved.
Like article 404, article 405 suffered amendments backed by the
LDAA. The proposed article of the Law Institute permitted opinion
evidence on character whenever reputation evidence of character could
be introduced.8 6 As amended, article 405(A) permits only reputation
evidence. The amended article does follow the Louisiana tradition, but
the Institute based its view on the corresponding federal provision87 and
on the national trend. In most instances, it seems, witnesses actually
testify to their own opinions of another's character but simply put them
in the reputation form required by law. Thus the original proposal may
have been a more straightforward recognition of the realities of character
testimony.
Article 406 stresses the importance of distinguishing between habit,
which is generally admissible as circumstantial evidence, and character,
which is generally inadmissible as circumstantial evidence. Habits are
always much more specific than character traits, and tend to be invariable
and semiautomatic.88 The marked difference in treatment of character
and habit is based on common experience: although people not infre-
quently act contrary to their character traits, they very rarely act contrary
to their habits.
84. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 404(C).
85. The difficulty in distinguishing between paragraphs 104(A) and 104(B) is empha-
sized in article 104 comment (b).
86. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 405(A).
87. Fed. R. Evid. 405(a).
88. See C. McCormick, supra note 47, § 195.
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Article 407, concerning evidence of subsequent remedial acts, codifies
prior Louisiana law and follows the federal provision. It does not
specifically address the application of the rule to strict and product
liability cases.8 9 At the suggestion of the Louisiana Trial Lawyers As-
sociation during compromise negotiations the words "if controverted"
were deleted from the second sentence of this article. 90 As originally
proposed, evidence of subsequent measures might be admissible not to
prove negligence but to prove another relevant point, but only if that
point is truly contested under the facts of the case. If the article as
enacted were read literally, therefore, evidence of subsequent acts will
be admissible to prove any relevant point other than negligence or
culpable conduct, regardless whether the point to be proved is abundantly
clear from the facts and is not contested by or even is stipulated to by
the opponent. This encourages a sham, since it is predictable that the
jury will misuse the evidence as proof of negligence, notwithstanding a
cautionary instruction under article 105 to the contrary. This untoward
result should be avoided by sound application of article 403. 91
Together, articles 408 and 410 generally bar evidence of compromises
in civil cases and plea discussions in criminal cases. An amendment to
the Institute proposal created article 408(B), which seems to make ev-
idence of attempted compromises admissible in criminal cases. This
creates a conflict with article 410, which clearly makes plea discussions
inadmissible in criminal cases. The intent must have been that the more
specific provisions of article 410 prime the hastily drawn amendment to
article 408. The same result can be reached by use of the phrase in
article 408(B), "[t]his Article does not require the exclusion ... ,"92 and
recognition that article 410 does require the exclusion of most of the
evidence referred to in article 408(A). In addition to those provisions
of 408(B), the last clause of that article authorizes the admissibility,
except as article 403 or other provisions of the Code may prohibit, of
evidence of the accused's attempt to make direct or indirect restitution
to the victim. Again, this is at theoretical odds with the exclusion of
such evidence in civil cases. 93
89. See La. Code Evid. art. 407 comment (b); Toups v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 507
So. 2d 809 (La. 1987), noted at Note, Admission into Evidence of Postaccident Warnings
in Product Liability Suits: Toups v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 34 Loy. L. Rev. 448 (1988).
90. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 407. See also Fed. R. Evid. 407.
91. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 403 serves a secondary function in preventing
abuse of other provisions in the Code. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56. When
evidence is offered putatively to prove a point that is not contested or is otherwise clear,
its probative value is substantially diminished. When it is predictable that jurors will use
it more for its prohibited purpose than for the independent line of relevancy for which
it is nominally offered its "unfair prejudice" increases.
92. La. Code Evid. art. 408(B) (emphasis added).
93. Id. art. 408(A).
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Payment of medical and similar expenses is dealt with in article
409. 94 By its terms it applies only in civil cases; moreover, article 408(B)
makes clear that this evidence is admissible in a criminal case. It is
sometimes important to distinguish payments or offers to compromise,
covered under article 408, from payments or offers to pay medical and
like expenses, covered under article 409. The former expressly excludes
statements or conduct surrounding the payment or offer while the latter
does not.95 For example, in a negotiation context the statement "I ran
the red light, so I'll pay you $1,000 to settle the case" is inadmissible
in its entirety. But with the statement "I ran the red light, so I'll pay
your medical expenses" only the latter part of the statement is inad-
missible. The admission concerning the running of the red light is
admissible.
One portion of article 409 may be misleading, for it suggests that
evidence regarding payment of medical expenses is not admissible "to
reduce" liability. The intent is that evidence of the payment should not
go to the jury for the purpose of currying its favor by raising the
inference that the payor is charitable or a humanitarian. Clearly the
prior payment may be employed as an offset of damages once assessed.
On the admissibility of evidence of liability insurance coverage, article
411, another product of last-minute compromise, governs. The article
does not say whether the evidence is admissible to prove negligence or
wrongful conduct, 96 but it seems clear that under article 403 such evidence
would be inadmissible for that purpose. The article specifies that when
the existence of insurance coverage is admissible 97 the amount of coverage
is generally inadmissible, unless disputed.
The new "rape-shield" statute is found in article 412. Analytically,
of course, it belongs in article 404 since it deals with the victim's
character for promiscuity, but it is lodged here simply in deference to
the federal numbering system. The article expands the protection98 to
94. The article is both an expansion and a restriction of the federal source provision.
It goes further than Federal Rule of Evidence 409 in that it applies by its terms to
property damage cases as well as personal injury suits. Unlike the federal provision,
however, it is applicable only in civil cases.
95. The rationale for the difference is that full and unfettered exchange is necessary
for compromise negotiations, but not for an offer to pay medical expenses. See Proposed
La. Code Evid. art. 408 comment (d), art. 409 comment (c).
96. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 411; Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 411.
97. Insurance might be admissible to show material facts other than negligence or
wrongful conduct, such as agency, ownership, applicability of the direct action statute,
or to attack the credibility of a witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 411; Proposed La. Code Evid.
art. 411.
98. The article generally makes the victim's reputaticn for and prior specific acts of
consensual intercourse inadmissible. Like the federal source provision, its purpose is "to
protect rape victims from degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about
[Vol. 49
NEW LOUISIANA CODE OF EVIDENCE
victims offered under the former statute99 in several ways. It applies to
all cases based on "sexually assaultive behavior," and mandates a pretrial
motion and closed hearing when the defense intends to offer evidence
of the victim's sexual acts prior or subsequent to the act now on trial.?°
The article permits not only evidence of prior sex acts with the accused
on the issue of consent, 0' but also evidence of acts with others offered
to establish the source of semen or injury. 10 2 Although the LDAA
prevailed in deleting a clause permitting the introduction of any evidence
having a "substantial and direct bearing on a clearly pertinent disputed
factual issue,"'0 3 it seems clear that any such defense evidence is con-
stitutionally required to be admitted.'04
The unfortunate and unnecessary thrust of article 413, which ad-
dresses evidence of settlement or tender, was confected by the Louisiana
Trial Lawyers Association during the last minute bargaining session. Its
general rule-that amounts paid in settlement or by tender shall not be
disclosed-is generally innocuous but unnecessary in light of articles 408
and 403. This article, unlike others in this series, does not specify the
purpose for which the evidence is inadmissible. Nor does the article
contain a second sentence, like others in the series, making clear that
the evidence may be admissible for other purposes. 05 It appears, rather,
to be a blanket prohibition without exceptions. It is believed that this
was not the intent, but rather the result of oversight due to hurried
drafting. If, hypothetically, a potential plaintiff in a multiple-plaintiff
action for damages settles his claim with the defendant for an unusually
high amount and then testifies favorably to defendant, could not the
plaintiff elicit the amount of the settlement on cross-examination in
their private lives," 124 Cong. Rec. 34912 (1978), cited in M. Graham, Handbook of
Federal Evidence, § 412.1, at 293 n.l (2d ed. 1986).
99. La. R.S. 15:498, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8.
100. La. Code Evid. art. 412(C), (D) and (E).
101. Id. art. 412(B)(2).
102. Id. art. 412(B)(1). These terms seem broad enough to include pregnancy or disease
as well. The former statute seemed to disallow all such evidence, but State v. Langendorfer,
389 So. 2d 1271 (La. 1980), held it admissible to prove the source of semen nonetheless.
103. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 412(B)(3).
104. See State v. Vaughn, 448 So. 2d 1280 (La. 1984); State v. Langendorfer, 389
So. 2d 1271 (La. 1980); Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1). The deleted phrase was an attempt to
breathe life into the corresponding federal references to evidence "constitutionally required
to be admitted." Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1). Deletion of the phrase does not, of course,
change the tenor of the constitution, but it does make it more difficult for the novice
or inexperienced criminal practitioner to spot the issue.
105. Through similar apparent oversight Federal Rule of Evidence 409 contains no
second sentence similar to others in the series. See Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 409
comment (e). Federal courts, however, have permitted evidence of payment of medical
expenses when offered for a purpose other than to prove liability. See M. Graham, supra
note 98, § 409.1, at 267 n.4.
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order to show the witness's bias? Under any rational system of law the
answer is clearly yes, but this article seems to prohibit the evidence.
Articles 401 and 402 can play a secondary role in limiting this article
to its intended, but unarticulated, scope.
Chapter Five-Privileges
Until the Law Institute completes the second stage of its codification
effort and the legislature acts on it, existing statutes and case law on
privileges will continue to govern."0
Chapter Six- Witnesses
Since the first five articles of this series are relatively uncontroversial
and do not effect substantial changes in prior Louisiana law, extended
commentary is unnecessary. Article 601 retains Louisiana's traditional
definition of the competent witness as a "person of proper understand-
ing. "107 Article 602 contains the familiar first-hand knowledge require-
ment. Article 603 on oaths and 604 on interpreters seem direct and
unambiguous. So does article 605, which disqualifies the trial judge from
being a witness in the case, although it may slightly modify former
law. 108
Article 606 generally prohibits anyone from testifying in a case in
which that person serves as juror. The article also regulates the admis-
sibility of a juror's testimony or affidavit in an inquiry into the validity
of the verdict or indictment. The general rule is that no juror may
testify on the tenor of deliberation leading to the verdict or indictment.
The exception permits juror testimony or affidavit "on the question
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear"' 9 or,
in criminal cases, "whether extraneous prejudicial information was im-
properly brought to the jury's attention.""10
106. See supra text accompanying note 45. For existing privileges, see, e.g., La. R.S.
13:3734-34.1 (Supp. 1988); La. R.S. 15:475-78 (1981 & Supp. 1988). See generally Forth,
Triche, The Current State of Evidentiary Privileges In Louisiana, 49 La. L. Rev. 731
(1989).
107. See La. R.S. 15:461 (1981), repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8; La. R.S.
13:3665 (1968). Compare Fed. R. Evid. 601. The determination of competency is an issue
governed by article 104(A).
108. La. R.S. 15:274, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8, seemed to permit the
judge to be a witness. But State v. Eubanks, 94 So. 2d 262 (La. 1957), seemed to hold
otherwise.
109. La. Code Evid. art. 605(B).
110. Id. La. R.S. 15:470, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8, and La. R.S.
15:471 (1981), amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 6, prohibited any and all attempts
to "impeach" a jury verdict with a juror's testimony. That blanket prohibition had been
modified by the courts. See, e.g., State v. Sinegal, 393 So. 2d 684 (La. 1981); State v.
Wisham, 384 So. 2d 385 (La. 1980).
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Most of the remaining articles of Chapter Six govern attacks on
the credibility of witnesses."' On its face article 607(A) appears to effect
one of the most major departures from former law. It provides any
party may attack the credibility of a witness, including the party calling
him. The attacking party no longer must show "hostility," 11 2 "sur-
prise,""' 3 or in civil cases, "adverse party" status. ' 14 On closer exami-
nation, however, the practical significance of the change is not great,
for it is rare that a party would have any reason to attack his own
witness unless there were hostility, surprise, or adverse party status." 5
The provision of article 607(A) allowing a party to impeach his own
witness may be open to an abuse that would permit a party to circumvent
the hearsay rule. A witness's unsworn prior inconsistent statements are.
generally inadmissible hearsay.1 6 In order to get these out-of-court state-
ments before the jury, however, a party might call a witness for no
other purpose than to "attack his credibility" with the prior statement,
which could not be introduced directly. Although a limiting instruction
would surely follow, 1 7 the party introducing the hearsay would know
that jurors could not follow a cautionary instruction to ignore the
assertive use of the out-of-court statement. This should not be permitted
and can be curbed only by judicially-imposed restraints."18
Article 607(B) states the familiar rule that a witness's credibility may
not be attacked until he has testified and may not be rehabilitated until
attacked. The second sentence of the article, however, allows questioning
regarding the "relationship [of the witness] to the parties, interest in
the lawsuit, or capacity to perceive or recollect." This provision rep-
resents a significant change from former law. 19 In effect, this permits
limited "rehabilitation" prior to attack when the imminence and tenor
of the attack is predictable. When, for example, a witness wearing thick
glasses is called to testify to the details of what he saw, questioning on
direct about his good eyesight while wearing glasses should be permitted
under this provision. Similarly, a witness who is related to the calling
party may be questioned on direct to establish his lack of bias.
111. Of course, articles 401 through 403 still apply in their secondary role, as is
generally the case throughout the Code.
112. See La. R.S. 15:487, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8.
113. See id. §§ 487-88, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 575, § 8.
114. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1634 (1970).
115. One notable change is that former law in instances of hostility or surprise limited
impeachment to prior inconsistent statements, whereas no such limitation is found in the
new Code. See La. Code Evid. art. 607(C) and (D).
116. Id. art. 801(C). Cf. id. art. 801(D)(1)(a).
117. Id. art 105.
118. See, e.g., Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1979); La. Code Evid.
art. 607 comment (a). Articles 403 and 611(A) may be cited in support of the limitation.
119. See, e.g., State v. Passman, 345 So. 2d 874 (La. 1977).
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Paragraphs (C) and (D) of article 607 provide a general framework
for analyzing the admissibility of evidence introduced to attack credi-
bility. Article 607(C) deals with intrinsic attack, that is, attack by ex-
amination. The provision is broad and permissive, generally permitting
questioning that is relevant to truthfulness or accuracy of testimony.
120
Article 607(D) regulates the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, that
is, any evidence other than that elicited from the witness while on the
stand. Subparagraph (D)(1) addresses extrinsic attacks to show bias,
interest, corruption, or a defect of capacity. 121 But perhaps misleadingly,
the provision states without qualification that the evidence "is admis-
sible. 1 22 This seems overbroad unless carefully construed. Because the
provision is found in the chapter on witnesses, it should be read as a
legitimation of this method of extrinsic impeachment. This is not to say
that such evidence always escapes the hearsay ban or other exclusionary
rules. Further, it would seem that this provision, like most others in
the Code, must be applied in light of the secondary applicability of the
balancing provisions of article 403. If, for example, a white witness
testified on direct examination contrary to the interests of a black party
to the lawsuit, evidence that the white witness was once seen at a
cocktail party chatting briefly with a person whose cousin had attended
a K.K.K. rally would certainly be inadmissible. And even more clearly
inadmissible would be the testimony of twenty different witnesses to the
same cocktail party chat.
Subparagraph (D)(2) of article 607 presents a subtle puzzle. It appears
clear enough on its face: the court should admit extrinsic evidence that
contradicts the witness's testimony or shows the witness's prior incon-
sistent statement 2 1 unless the court finds that the risks of undue com-
sumption of time, confusion of the issues, or unfair prejudice substantially
outweigh the probative value of the evidence on the witness's credibility.
But if article 403 applies to subparagraph (D)(l), 24 then (D)(1) does not
appear to differ meaningfully from (D)(2). The secondary applicability
of article 403 engrafts onto (D)(1) the same balancing test as that
expressly found in (D)(2). It makes no sense to divide paragraph (D)
into two parts if (D)(1) and (D)(2) state essentially the same test. The
120. The article allows introduction of this evidence "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by legislation." This makes reference, inter alia, to article 403's balancing test. See also,
e.g., La. Code Evid. arts. 608(B), 609, 609.1, and 610.
121. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 613 imposes a foundational requirement of
intrinsic questioning and failure to admit the fact prior to offering extrinsic evidence of
bias, interest, corruption, or defect of capacity.
122. La. Code Evid. art. 607(D)(1).
123. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 613 establishes the foundation of intrinsic
questioning and failure to admit prior to extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement.
124. See supra text following note 122.
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answer lies in the hurried redrafting of the Institute's original proposal.
Subparagraph (D)(2) constitutes the "collateral evidence" rule. 25 As
proposed by the Institute, the evidence specified in article 607(D)(2) was
"not admissible' '1 26 unless the court found that its probative value on
credibility "substantially outweigh[ed]"' 27 the listed risks. The LDAA
took the view that this phraseology was too negative, and that the
provision should be phrased in somewhat more receptive terms. As
altered, however, the text of (D)(2) seems largely duplicative of that of
(D)(1) as supplemented by article 403. 21 It is believed, however, that
courts can reach equitable results by careful application of the balancing
test of subparagraph (D)(2).12 9 Even as enacted the clause was intended
to exclude all or most of the extrinsic evidence that would have been
classed as "collateral" under former law.
Article 608 deals with attacks on a witness's credibility through the
use of character evidence. The article makes one imporatant change in
Louisiana law: only evidence of the witness's reputation for truthfulness
or untruthfulness may be presented, not evidence of general moral
character. Except for that divergence, the article essentially codifies prior
law.' 30 Paragraph (B), in accordance with pre-Code law, prohibits ex-
trinsic inquiry into the witness's prior acts for the purpose of proving
his truthful or untruthful character 3 ' but does not prohibit such inquiry
for a distinct purpose, such as illustrating bias, interest or corruption,3 2
125. See La. Code Evid. art. 607(D)(2); see also id. comments (k) through (o); La.
R.S. 15:494, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8.
126. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 607(D)(2) (emphasis added); see also id. comments
(a) and (b).
127. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 607(D)(2).
128. See supra text following note 122.
129. All extrinsic evidence offered solely to attack a witness's credibility is of somewhat
questionable probative value in that it is time consuming and does not relate directly to
any material issue in the case. When the extent of its diminishment of credibility is
substantial, particularly vis-a-vis an important witness, courts have properly tended to
permit it. When the effect on credibility is relatively weaker, however, the extrinsic evidence
has been excluded as "collateral." See generally, C. McCormick, supra note 47, §§ 36
(prior inconsistent statements) and 47 (contradictions). The Federal Rules of Evidence
contain no provision akin to article 607(D), but federal courts have been effective in
addressing the "collateral evidence" issue by use of Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
essentially the same test as Louisiana Code of Evidence article 607(D)(2). Because article
607(D)(1) is phrased in even more receptive terms, Louisiana courts should be slightly
more receptive to that evidence than to the evidence referred to in (D)(2).
130. Compare La. R.S. 15:490, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8, which virtually
invited the jury to misuse the evidence when the accused was the witness.
131. By prohibiting even cross-examination as to the witness's particular "acts, vices
or courses of conduct," article 608(B) is more restrictive than its federal counterpart but
retains the traditional Louisiana rule embodied in La. R.S. 15:491, repealed by 1988 La.
Acts No. 515, § 8.
132. See La. Code Evid. arts. 607(C) and (D)(1).
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or defects of capacity.'33 Paragraph (C) permits on cross-examination
of the character witness the "have you heard" questions which are
intended to test the basis of his knowledge of the first witness's rep-
utation. These sorts of questions were authorized by Michelson v. United
States3 4 and have long been permitted under Louisiana law.' 35
Attacks on a witness's credibility by evidence of his prior convictions
of crime is regulated in civil cases by article 609 and in criminal cases
by article 609.1. This is one of the relatively few topics in the Code
upon which the contending forces could not agree on a unitary rule.
The civil rule is a modification of the federal source provision. 36 The
criminal case provision generally codifies prior law, which allowed ev-
idence of the fact of a witness's prior criminal convictions,'1 7 but also
specifies three instances when the actual details of the crimes are ad-
missible. ""
The original Institute proposal for article 609 was quite similar to
the federal model and to the rule finally adopted for civil cases. Proposed
article 609 would have applied in both civil and criminal cases. In the
133. See id.
134. 335 U.S. 469, 69 S. Ct. 213 (1948). The Michelson rule is also codified in the
last sentence of article 405(A).
135. See the procedural safeguards established in State v. Johnson, 389 So. 2d 372
(La. 1980) (there must be no question that the act took place, a reasonable likelihood
that word of the act would have passed through the community, neither the act nor the
rumor may be too remote in time, and the act must be related to truthfulness). These
are not modified by the new Code.
136. Fed. R. Evid. 609. Among the changes, article 609 specifies that no details of
the crime are admissible, simplifies the ten-year limit provision found in Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(B), and adds paragraph (F) to clarify that arrests, indictments, and pro-
secutions are not admissible under this article. In rare instances arrests, indictments, or
prosecutions may be admissible for another purpose, however, such as showing bias,
interest, or corruption. See La. Code Evid. arts. 607(D), 613; State v. Brady, 381 So.
2d 819 (La. 1980).
137. See La. R.S. 15:495, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8. This article is an
amendment to the Law Institute proposal, which was closer to the Federal Rule.
138. La. Code Evid. art. 609.1(C). Subparagraph (C)(1), permitting details when the
witness denies or does not recall the conviction, seems unfortunate. It acts as an inap-
propriate penalty on the witness who is confused, deceptive, or ill-prepared. Subparagraph
(C)(2), permitting details when the witness has testified to exculpatory facts concerning
the conviction, is equitable but does not reflect clearly the probable legislative intent that
only the adversary is permitted to show the true (heinous) nature of the offense to counter
the witness's exculpatory version. As written the provision seems to permit the party
calling the witness to use extrinsic evidence to bolster the witness's exculpatory version
of the crime underlying his conviction. This was not, it is believed, the drafters' intent.
Note, however, that the preface of paragraph (C) provides that such evidence "may"
become admissible. See also id. art. 403. Subparagraph (C)(3), permitting details if highly
probative, seems sound but warrants the reminder that the "probative value" here addressed
relates only to the witness's credibility. An example of the subsection would be when the
theft for which the witness was convicted was effected by particularly untruthful practices.
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latter class of cases, the proposed provision offered a substantial change
from former law, under which any criminal conviction could be used
to attack the credibility of a witness. 3 9 Quite predictably, this aspect
of the proposal met the wrath of criminal prosecutors. The prosecutors
possessed the political power to defeat the entire Code and thus were
able to force modification of this proposal.
The defeat of this reform and the functional retention of former
law on this issue may represent the greatest failing of the codification
project. Criminal practitioners are well aware that when the accused
testifies and the jury learns of his prior convictions, the jury cannot
and does not follow a cautionary instruction to consider the convictions
only on the issue of the witness's credibility. In fact, the jurors use
evidence of prior convictions for their prohibited character evidence
purpose. 40 The predictability of the jury's misuse of the evidence of
prior convictions increases in direct proportion to the similarity of the
prior crimes with the crime charged. It is lamentable that this abuse
will continue under the new Code.' 4'
Article 610 prohibits use of the religious beliefs of a witness to
attack or support his credibility, except for those rare occasions when
a witness's religious affiliation is relevant for another purpose, such as
to show bias or interest. It seems inappropriate to specify that religion
is inadmissible when offered "for the sole purpose" of attacking cred-
ibility. 42 The word "sole" is not only an addition to the Law Institute
proposal but also a departure from the federal rules, which contain no
such limiting word. The inclusion of the word "sole" might suggest
that when religion is offered for a permissible purpose, the prohibition
contained in article 610 does not apply, and hence the evidence becomes
admissible for the prohibited credibility purpose as well. Despite this
implication, evidence of religious convictions should not be admissible
to show credibility under any circumstances, and when introduced for
139. See La. R.S. 15:495, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8; Proposed La.
Code Evid. art. 609.
140. See La. Code Evid. art. 404(A). Thus the accused with a prior record faces the
dilemma whether to stay off the stand and have the jury draw negative inferences from
his silence or to take the stand and face the increased likelihood of conviction due to
the jury's misuse of his prior convictions. See C. McCormick, supra note 47, § 43, at
99.
141. Louisiana is believed to be the only American jurisdiction perihitting the use of
any criminal conviction to attack credibility. See G. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law
of Evidence, § 8.3, at 344 n.ll (2d ed. 1987); C. McCormick, supra note 47, § 43, at
93 n.5. Given the experience of Proposed Louisiana Code of Evidence article 609, legislative
reform on this issue does not seem predictable. It is not impossible that the judiciary
could curb this abuse on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 53 Haw.
254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
142. La. Code Evid. art. 610 (emphasis added).
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a permissible purpose, the court should issue a cautionary instruction
under article 105.
Article 611 contains important procedural rules applicable to wit-
nesses and to the questioning process. Paragraph (A) recognizes broad
judicial discretion in all matters concerning witnesses and proof. Par-
agraph (B) uses the term "cross-examination" as meaning simply the
second questioning, that is, the questioning after the calling party has
completed his questioning. 43 Under the Code, the term "cross-exami-
nation" does not suggest a necessary right to question beyond the scope
of the direct or to lead the witness. Thus when the civil plaintiff calls
the defendant to the stand, subsequent questioning by defense counsel,
while technically "cross-examination," is generally limited to the scope
of the direct examination since defense counsel may call his client for
questioning as to other matters during his own case. Otherwise, with
functionally adverse witnesses, the "wide-open" rule of cross-examhia-
tion is retained.
Article 611(C) limits the leading of one's own witness to four in-
stances: (i) when the witness is an adverse party, or is "identified with'" "
an adverse party; (ii) when the witness is hostile; 145 (iii) when the witness
cannot otherwise testify; 146 or, (iv) when the witness is an expert. 47
Leading questions are generally prohibited when counsel is "cross ex-
amining" his own client or a friendly witness. 148 Paragraph (D) codifies
143. See id. art. 611 comment (c).
144. This term generally encompasses, but is broader than, the term "representative"
as defined in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1634 (1970). It would include,
for example, plaintiff's questioning of the insured in a direct action against only the
insurance company, or, usually, his questioning of one spouse in an action against only
the other. And the term is broader than the "hostility" exception in La. R.S. 15:277,
repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8. See La. Code Evid. art. 611 comment (f).
145. The phraseology of article 611(c) suggests that there are five exceptions, for the
article contains the phrase "a witness who is unable or unwilling to respond to proper
questioning." The language, a change from the article as proposed by the Law Institute,
seems to have no additional effect at all. To the extent the witness is "unwilling" he
seems subject to leading questions as a "hostile" witness. See La. R.S. 15:277, repealed
by La. Acts No. 515, § 8; State v. Monk, 315 So. 2d 727 (La. 1975). To the extent he
is "unable," he is subject to leading questions under the "except as may be necessary
to develop his testimony" clause. See infra note 146. Nothing in this article limits the
court's power to instruct the witness to answer or to hold him in contempt.
146. Louisiana courts have long permitted, in effect, leading a witness "as may be
necessary to develop his testimony." La. Code Evid. art. 611(C). This was intended to
cover such instances as the child witness, the very aged witness, the witness who does
not speak English well, or the refreshing of a witness's recollection. See Proposed La.
Code Evid. art. 611 comment (b).
147. Leading an expert is permitted only when the expert testifies as to his opinions.
La. Code Evid. art. 611(C).
148. Here Paragraph (C) again employs the term a witness "identified with" the
questioner's client. See supra note 144.
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familiar limits on the scope of redirect examination and the possibility
of recross.' 49 Paragraph (E), governing rebuttal, was highly controversial.
The proposed article authorized a right to surrebuttal "if necessary or
appropriate to prevent unfairness."' 50 Although the proposed reference
to a possible surrebuttal was deleted, there seems no question that in
unusual cases such a right should be recognized.' 5'
The witness's use of a writing to refresh his recollection is regulated
by article 612(A) in civil matters and by 612(B) in criminal cases. These
provisions generally follow pre-existing law.
Article 613 creates the familiar foundation requirement which pro-
hibits the use of extrinsic evidence to show bias, interest or corruption,
prior criminal convictions, or prior inconsistent statements unless the
witness has been asked about the fact but has failed to admit it.152
Article 614 sets out the rules governing the calling and questioning
of witnesses by the trial judge. The provision is inartfully drawn in that
the "exception" of paragraph (D) virtually eliminates the orginal pro-
posal, which left the judge relatively free to call and question witnesses.'
Under paragraph (D), the judge may not question a witness or call a
witness in a jury case unless authorized by all parties. This largely
prevents the occasional clarifying question that helps prevent jury con-
fusion and speeds up the trial. The LDAA opposed the original proposal,
concerned that some judges might "take over" the presentation of the
case.
Sequestration of witnesses is regulated by article 615, which generally
preserves and clarifies former law by specifying those persons who may
not be excluded from the courtroom. The LDAA proposal allowed the
trial judge to exclude the victim of a crime from a sequestration order,
but this provision stirred controversy. At the demand of the criminal
defense bar, moderating factors to this exemption were included. Should
the prosecutor wish to have the victim remain in the courtroom, the
victim must testify before the exemption from sequestration is granted
and cannot be recalled either in the case-in-chief or in rebuttal. Moreover,
the victim may not sit at counsel table, and the court shall otherwise
act to maintain decorum and assure a fair trial.15 4
149. See La. R.S. 15:281, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8.
150. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 611(E).
151. See State v. Turner, 337 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976); State v. Scott, 320 So. 2d 538
(La. 1975); Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 611(E) & comment (d). In some cases the right
seems constitutionally mandated. See La. Const. art. I, § 16.
152. An "interests of justice" exception permits waiver of the foundation in unusual
cases, such as when the existence of a prior inconsistent statement was discovered only
after the witness had been excused and is no longer available. See La. Code Evid. art.
613 comment (c).
153. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 614.
154. La. Code Evid. art. 615(A)(4).
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Chapter Seven-Opinions and Experts
Although Chapter Seven effects some improvements in prior law,
its primary benefit lies in clarification and codification of the law in
this important area. It is a short Chapter, consisting of only six articles.
Article 701 permits lay opinion in a manner that seems at first blush
to be markedly more receptive to such evidence than was former law,,"
but which, upon further analysis, does not effect major change. The
former statute seemed to prohibit absolutely testimony by a lay witness
on any "impression or opinion."'-5 6 The difficulty arose in distinguishing
between opinion and fact, and often testimony that seemed more the
former than the latter was permitted.117 The appellate cases on this pont
make clear that Louisiana courts have often permitted opinions, but
usually only when the opinion is based directly on the perceptions of
the witness, rather than on hearsay or speculation, and when the opinion
is one about which a lay witness can usually offer a reliable opinion
that is not likely to confuse or mislead the fact-finder.'58 The new
provision requires no more and no less. The demand that the opinion
be "based on the perception of the witness"' 5 9 excludes opinions based
primarily on conclusion or speculation. Likewise, the requirement that
the opinion be "helpful"' 6 to the trier-of-fact, although vague, permits
the court to keep from the jury opinions of the sort generally unreliable.
Expert testimony and the bases of expert opinions are regulated by
article 702 and 703 respectively. They do not make any substantial
changes from former law. 16'
The thrust of article 704 is that an otherwise admissible opinion "is
not to be excluded solely because it embraces an ultimate issue.' 1 62
155. See La. R.S. 15:463, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 575, § 8, which provided
that the lay witness "can testify only as to facts within his knowledge, and neither as
to any recital of facts heard by him, nor as to any impression or opinion that he may
have."
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., State v. Sayles, 395 So. 2d 695 (La. 1981) (powder on shirt was
sheetrock dust); State v. Garner, 229 So. 2d 179 (La. 1969) (substance was blood); State
v. Robins, 499 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (voice on tape was female). See also
Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 701 comment (c).
158. See, e.g., State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983) (despite "opinion" prohibition,
witness may testify to reasonable inferences based on his personal observation); State v.
Alexander, 430 So. 2d 621 (La. 1983) (witness may testify to inferences several steps
removed from raw-sense perceptions if more helpful to jury than mere recitation of factual
perceptions); Coon, Lay Opinions in Criminal Cases: A Flexible Prohibition, 33 La. B.J.
12 (1985).
159. La. Code Evid. art. 701(1) (emphasis added).
160. Id. art. 701(2). See also id. art. 403.
161. See La. R.S. 15:464, 466, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8. See generally
the comments to Louisiana Code of Evidence articles 702 and 703.
162. La. Code Evid. art. 704.
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During the early negotiations on the Code, many considered this a major
change in Louisiana law, but it is not. Generally, of course, a witness
may not testify on the ultimate issue, but only because of the rule
restricting opinion evidence. 63 In criminal cases, for example, where the
accused alleges insanity at the time of the offense, members of a sanity
commission can offer their expert opinions whether the accused was
sane or not.'6 Generally, of course, the law continues to prefer the
more concrete and specific to the more conclusory and inferential, and
this is particularly true where the issue is the ultimate one in the
lawsuit. 165
In Louisiana it has been the rule that an expert must state the
factual bases for his opinion,166 even when they are not otherwise ad-
missible.167 One way to get otherwise inadmissible evidence before a
Louisiana jury-a way that few, perhaps have realized-is to hire an
expert and have him use otherwise inadmissible evidence as the basis
for his relevant opinion. Article 705 guards against this abuse by mod-
ifying prior law. In civil cases an expert may offer opinions without
first stating the underlying facts, 61 though the cross-examiner may elicit
the factual bases of the expert's opinion. In criminal cases the expert
must state bases that are otherwise admissible, but any basis for his
opinion that is otherwise inadmissible may be elicited only at the option
of the cross-examiner. 69
Article 706 closes the Chapter by regulating court appointment of
experts. Paragraph (D), added by amendment to the original proposal, 70
limits the article to civil cases.
Chapter Eight-Hearsay and Exceptions
Although codification simplifies and clarifies this confusing area, it
remains one of the most difficult topics in the law of evidence. This
163. Id. art. 701.
164. See La. Code Crim. P. arts. 643-49; State v. Claibon, 395 So. 2d 770 (La. 1981).
The second sentence of article 704 does not prohibit this, of course. The point is that
in some cases opinion on sanity is simply the other side of the coin from opinion on
guilt or innocence.
165. See generally State v. Wheeler, 416 So. 2d 78 (La. 1982), discussed in Pugh and
McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983: Evidence, 44 La. L. Rev. 335, 344
(1983).
166. La. R.S. 15:465, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8; State v. Clay, 408
So. 2d 1295 (La. 1982); Dixie Pipeline Co. v. Barry, 227 So. 2d I (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969), writ refused, 255 La. 145, 229 So. 2d 731 (1970).
167. See, e.g., State v. Watley, 301 So. 2d 332 (La. 1974) (past criminal history);
State v. Hilburn, 512 So. 2d 497 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) (hearsay).
168. The court, sua sponte or pursuant to the request of the opposing party, may
order the expert to state the underlying facts prior to giving his opinion. La. Code Evid.
art. 705. See also id. arts. 403, 611(A).
169. Id. art. 704(B).
170. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 706.
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chapter generally follows the federal model by explaining what is and
is not hearsay (article 801), generally prohibiting hearsay (article 802),
listing exceptions regarding which the declarant's availability to testify
is immaterial (article 803), listing the exceptions regarding which una-
vailability of the declarant is a prerequisite (article 804). The chapter
also clarifies the law pertaining to multiple hearsay (article 805) and
that pertaining to attacking the credibility of the out-of-court declarant
(article 806).
Article 801 defines hearsay. Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) are familiar
and consistent with former law. Paragraph (A)(2) makes clear that out-
of-court conduct not intended to be a message ("non-assertive conduct")
cannot be a "statement," and thus cannot constitute hearsay under the
definition of paragraph (C).' 7'
Article 801(D) defines nonhearsay. Much of this paragraph is com-
plex and intriguing, and many of its subsections make changes in Louis-
iana law. Subparagraph (1) addresses the out-of-court statements of a
witness. The initial portion of the subparagraph requires that the de-
clarant testify and that the declarant be subject to cross-examination
regarding the prior statement; unless these prerequisites exist, the court
need not consider the remainder of the subparagraph. But assuming
these requirements are met, the lettered subparts of subparagraph (1)
offer four exclusions from the hearsay ban.
Under the first, contained in subparagraph (1)(a), the witness's out-
of-court statement is not hearsay if it is inconsistent with the current
testimony, was given under oath, and came at a prior proceeding at
which the "accused" had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
This provision makes a change in prior Louisiana law; 72 it differs
substantially from the Institute's proposal.
By the use of the term "accused,' 7 the subparagraph seems to
limit its application to criminal cases only. 74 Hence, in civil cases the
general rule is the same as under former law: a witness's prior incon-
171. Although non-assertive conduct could constitute hearsay under the traditional
common law rule, the modem trend is to classify it as non-hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid.
801; La. Code Evid. art. 801 comment (c).
172. Under former law a witness's prior inconsistent statements were admissible solely
to attack credibility and not for their assertive value. See La. R.S. 15:493, repealed by
1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8; State v. Allien, 366 So. 2d 1308 (La. 1978). The proposed
Code embraced this approach. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 801(D)(1) and id. comment
(a).
173. Throughout the Code of Evidence, use of the word "accused" indicates that a
rule is limited to criminal matters. See La. Code Evid. art. 101 comment (b).
174. It may be that in a rare instance the subparagraph may properly be invoked in
a civil case. When a party to the current civil case was the accused in an earlier criminal
trial, the statement of a state witness at the preliminary hearing or in the accused's earlier
trial seems arguably admissible under this provision.
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sistent statements will always be hearsay if offered assertively and there-
fore are admissible only to attack credibility. But in criminal matters,
where the article does apply, it is narrow and ambiguous. It seems to
apply only to the earlier statements of prosecution witnesses, for it
requires that the earlier statements have been subject to "cross-exami-
nation" by the "accused." 1 75 It may well be, however, that the drafters
of the provision, more familiar with former usage than with the ter-
minology of the proposed Code, used the term "cross-examination" in
the broad sense as including the cross-questioning of witness who "sur-
prises" or proves "hostile" to the calling party. 76 On this basis, it may
be reasonable to apply the subsection to a hostile defense witness who
testified at the earlier proceeding. Further, when a co-defendant at the
earlier proceeding had called a witness whose testimony was adverse to
the accused, the accused's right to cross-question the witness at the
earlier proceeding seems to trigger the applicablility of this subparagraph.
The other three parts of the subparagraph, (b), (c), and (d) of
paragraph 801(D)(1), will be more familiar to the practitioner than the
unique and curious tenor of subparagraph (a). In general thrust these
parts do not diverge significantly from the proposed Code, and generally
follow former law on consistent statements, 77 out-of-court identifica-
tions, 78 and initial complaints of sexual assault. 79
Subparagraph 801(D)(2) codifies the law on admissions by a party,
defining them as nonhearsay.8 0 This subparagraph effects no major
change in prior law. By contrast, the provisions of subparagraph 801
(D)(3), the relational and privity admissions, either change Louisiana
law or make explicit the obscure rules that were rarely reflected in
reported decisions. The rationale for excluding these sorts of admissions
from the hearsay definition differs from other hearsay exclusions. The
exclusion does not rest on the inherent reliability 'of the statements, as
most hearsay exclusions and exceptions do; nor does it follow from
corollaries of adversary system principles, as with the admissions exclu-
175. La. Code Evid. art. 801(D)(1)(d).
176. See La. R.S. 15:487-88, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8.
177. See id. §§ 496-97, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8; State v. Marcal, 388
So. 2d 656 (La. 1980); La. Code Evid. art. 801(D)(1)(b) comment (b).
178. This provision broadens former law and seems troublingly subject to abuse. It
substantially alters the Law Institute proposal. See State v. Jacobs, 344 So. 2d 659 (La.
1976) (inadmissible hearsay); Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 801(D)(1)(c) and comment (c).
179. Under former law such declarations seem to have been classed as exceptions to
the hearsay exclusion. See, e.g., State v. Pace, 301 So. 2d 323 (La. 1974).
180. The admissions of subparagraph (2)(a) are "personal." Those of subparagraph
(2)(b) are "adoptive." Those of subparagraph (2)(c) are "authorized." Under former law
these have generally been viewed as exceptions to the hearsay rule. See La. Code Evid.
art. 801(D)(2) comments (a)-(d).
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sions of subparagraph (D)(2).' s' Rather, considerations of fairness, com-
pleteness and the like underlie these exclusions." 2
There are two relational admission exclusions. The provisions con-
cerning admissions of agents or employees are contained in subparagraph
(3)(a), which expands former concepts of agency.' The traditional "co-
conspirator" rule is found in (3)(b), but is expanded to make its ap-
plicability to civil cases clear. 184
The privity admissions apply solely in civil cases. Examples of these
instances of nonhearsay include, for subparagraph (3)(c), the statement
of the insured offered against the beneficiary; for (3)(d), the statement
of an assignor or predecessor in title offered against the assignee or the
purchaser; for (3)(e), the declaration of the deceased offered against the
plaintiff in a survivorship action or action for wrongful death; and for
(3)(f), the statement of an injured or tortious child offered against a
party responsible for the child's injury, or, in an action to recover for
damage caused by the child, offered against the person responsible for
the child's torts.18 5
The unfortunate provisions of article 801(D)(4), added to the In-
stitute's proposal during the compromise discussions, perpetuate the
amorphous res gestae concept, tracking the exact language of former
law.8 6 This provision seems to embrace nonhearsay operative facts and
the declarations otherwise made exceptions to the hearsay exclusion by
article 803(1), (2), and (3). 187 To the extent it includes more, it will
work injustice. However uncertain the precise ambit of subparagraph
(D)(4), whatever falls within it is nonhearsay.
181. Id. comment (b).
182. See id. art. 801(D)(3) comment (a). The rationale as to article 801(D)(3)(a) and
(b) is that "one who undertakes to create an agency relationship should generally be made
to reap the deleterious as well as the beneficial effects of what the agent sows." Id. As
to subparagraphs (3)(c) through (3)(f), the underlying rationale is that "one who under
substantive law stands in another's shoes for the purposes of the lawsuit should generally
be made to take the bad with the good." Id.
183. See id. comment (b).
184. See id. comment (c).
185. See id.
186. La. R.S. 15:447-48, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8. The form of the
res gestae provision found in article 404(B) seems preferable to this formulation. Both,
of course, are unnecessary and can only lead to continuing confusion. The concept is
"arcane." Sanders, supra note 1, at 215. The major flaw in employing this formulation
is that, as has long been the case, the practitioner must review numerous cases in an
attempt to determine whether the definition applies to the statement at hand, and usually
comes away from that task more confused than when the research was begun.
187. The phrases "the instructive . . . words and acts of the participants" and "im-
mediate concomitants of it" seem present sense impressions under article 803(1) or state-
ments of then existing conditions under article 803(3). The phrase "under the immediate
pressure of the occurrence" suggests the excited utterance exception of article 803(2). Non-
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Article 802 should have a dual effect. Not only does it set out the
general rule excluding hearsay, but also, by limiting exceptions to those
in the Code in other legislation,' the article ends the judicial creation
of new hearsay exceptions. Henceforth, only the legislature, not the
courts, may create new general exceptions to hearsay189
The twenty-four hearsay exceptions of article 803 are generally fa-
miliar to Louisiana practitioners. 190 The article creates no heretofore
unknown exceptions and effects no substantial change. What changes
are made were seen as clarifications or improvements of former law. 19'
The benefit of this article and article 804 is that they clarify the law
by offering a precise codification of the contours and requirements of
each exception.
Article 803 exemptions apply whether the declarant is unavailable
or not. This is the major distinction between this article and article 804.
Unlike its federal counterpart, article 803 contains no "catch all" ex-
ception. 92 Among the more frequently occurring article 803 exceptions
are the present sense impression, 93 excited utterance,' 94 then existing
mental, emotional or physical condition, 95 past recollection recorded, 96
civil business records, 197 and public records. 98
hearsay operative facts such as the robber's words, "This is a stick-up," are not offered
for their assertive value. The fact that he said it, along with the gun in his hand, made
it a stick-up. The problem, of course, is that when the rationale and boundaries of a
concept do not clearly appear from the text of the law, practitioners tend to misunderstand
it and courts are apt to misinterpret it. See Moylan, Res Gestae, Or Why is That Event
Speaking and What is it Doing in This Courtroom?, 63 A.B.A. J. 968 (1977).
188. Many specialized hearsay exceptions of limited applicability are found in other
codes and in the Revised Statutes. A policy decision was made that the more generally
applicable exceptions in the Code should not be hidden by inclusion of the narrower and
less frequently applied exceptions now found elsewhere. See, e.g., La. Code Civ. P. art.
1702(D) (proof in confirmation of a default); La. Code Crim. P. art. 105 (coroner's
report); La. R.S. 10:1-205 (1983) (usage of trade). See also La. Code Evid. art. 802
comment (c).
189. But see La. Code Evid. art. 804(B)(6).
190. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
191. See generally La. Code Evid. art. 803 comment.
192. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(24). The decision not to include a "catch all" exception
under article 803 means that henceforth in Louisiana all hearsay exceptions are codified
or statutory, except in rare civil cases when the declarant is unavailable and the statement
is highly trustworthy. See La. Code Evid. art. 804(B)(6).
193. La. Code Evid. art. 803(1).
194. Id. art. 803(2).
195. Id. art. 803(3). The first three exceptions of article 803 have traditionally been
classed under the generic shibboleth "res gestae." See supra notes 186 and 187 and
accompanying text.
196. La. Code Evid. art. 803(5).
197. Id. art. 803(6). The criminal case business records exception is found at article
804(B)(5).
198. Id. art. 803(8).
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The six hearsay exceptions of article 804 all require the prerequisite
showing that the declarant is unavailable to testify. 199 Paragraph (A)
defines unavailability broadly and, for the first time in Louisiana, offers
a uniform definition. The exceptions frequently occurring are former
testimony, 200 the dying declaration, 201 the statement against interest,20 2
and business records offered in a criminal case. 203 Subparagraph (B)(6)
embodies a "catch all" exception that is rather narrow. It permits a
court to admit hearsay in a civil case when the declarant is unavailable, 204
the statement is trustworthy considering all relevant circumstances, the
proponent has made all reasonable attempts to obtain nonhearsay evi-
dence to prove the fact sought to be established, and the proponent
has given advance written notice to the opponent. 20 1 This provision
anticipates the unusual case wherein the hearsay is very reliable under
the facts surrounding its creation but no traditionally recognized excep-
tion applies.
Article 805 codifies the general common law and Louisiana rule that
hearsay within hearsay is excluded unless a hearsay exception can be
found for each link.2 °6 Article 806 addresses attacking the credibility
and rehabilitation of the hearsay declarant. 20 7
Chapter Nine-Authentication
The five articles on authentication change little from prior Louisiana
law, but have the advantage of clarifying it and bringing the general
rules together in one place.
199. This preliminary fact is to be determined by the court without the ordinary
evidentiary restrictions. See id. art. 104(A).
200. Id. art. 804(B)(1), which broadens somewhat the scope of the former exception.
201. Id. art. 804(B)(2), which broadens its predecessor by applicability to civil cases
and all criminal cases.
202. Id. art. 804(B)(3).
203. Id. art. 804(B)(5).
204. See id. art. 804(A).
205. Id. art. 804(B)(6). This ad hoc exception has been recognized occasionally in
Louisiana. See, e.g., Burley v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 319 So. 2d 334 (La.
1975); Salley Grocer Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 223 So. 2d 5 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1969).
206. See, e.g., State v. Monroe, 345 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1977). Analytically, a link
which appears to be hearsay under the traditional approach may in fact be defined as
non-hearsay by article 801(D). Article 805's use of the word "hearsay" means as defined
by article 801.
207. The article also permits attack or support of the declarant's credibility in instances
of non-hearsay as defined in article 801(D)(2)(c) (authorized agency admission) or (D)(3)
(relational and privity admissions). In these instances the declarant is not in court, unlike
the situations embraced by article 801(D)(1) and (D)(2)(a) and (b). See also La. Code
Evid. art. 806 comment (d).
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Article 901 addresses the foundational requirement that real or doc-
umentary evidence be authenticated by the proponent prior to admission
into evidence. This threshold requirement is satisfied by evidence upon
which a rational juror could conclude that the item is what the proponent
holds it out to be.20 8 The article offers an illustrative list of methods
for authentication. The most frequently occurring method of these is
the testimony of a witness that the item is what the proponent suggests. 209
Although the article does not address the requirement of a chain of
custody, in cases where the item is subject to material alteration or
tampering such a showing remains a prerequisite to admissibility. 210
Article 902 makes a variety of listed documents self-authenticating,
including most public documents21" ' and authentic acts. 212 Articles 904
and 905 make a certified true copy of an original public document or
other public record self-authenticating.
Chapter Ten-Contents of Writings
The eight articles of Chapter Ten should lead to the unlamented
demise of the term "best evidence. ' 213 Article 1001 offers definitions
of terms used in the Chapter. Of particular importance is the definition
of "original," which includes anything intended by the parties to con-
stitute an original, such as is the case with "multiple originals." A
"duplicate" is defined to include carbon copies and photocopies. Article
1002 then states the general rule that the original is required to prove
the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph. But the requirement
applies only when the proponent seeks "to prove the content" of the
item. Often a fact may be proved without use of an available writing,
recording, or photograph. 21 4 But when the fact cannot be proved oth-
erwise, 2 5 or when the proponent chooses to prove the fact by use of
208. Id. art. 901(A). See also id. comment (c).
209. Id. art. 901(B)(I).
210. See id. art. 901(A) comment (d); id. arts. 403, 104(B).
211. Id. art. 902(1), (2) and (3).
212. Id. art. 902(8).
213. See La. R.S. 15:436, repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 8. This area of the
law has been described as "confusing and confused." C. McCormick, supra note 47, §
233, at 565. The term "best evidence rule" is misleadingly broad, and not particularly
descriptive of the law's requirements. See La. Code Evid., Ch. 10, Introductory Note to
Original Writings Articles.
214. The fact of receipt of money, for example, can ordinarily be proved by testimony,
even though a written receipt may exist. Likewise, the description of a certain scene may
be established by testimony although a photograph of the scene exists. Sound trial tactics
may militate in favor of using the writing or photograph, but the law of evidence does
not require it.
215. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 1839 (transfer of title of immovable).
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the writing, recording, or photograph, this article requires the original. 21 6
The seeming stringency of this rule is relaxed by the major qualification
contained in article 1003, an exception that devours much of the previous
article's rule. A duplicate, under that article, is generally admissible to
the same extent as the original. 217
Article 1004 lists five familiar exceptions allowing other evidence in
lieu of the original. By use of the term "other evidence," the article
tacitly does away with the former requirements of degrees of secondary
evidence.21 8 Comparison of article 1004(4) with article 1003(1) suggests
a convenient rule of thumb: when a writing, recording, or photograph
is closely related to a controlling issue in the case, the original is required
and a duplicate does not suffice; but if it is not closely related to a
controlling issue, neither the original nor a duplicate is required and
other evidence is sufficient.
Article 1005 through 1008 offer rules of specialized applicability. 21 9
Chapter Eleven-Miscellaneous Rules
Article 1001 states the general rule that the Code's provisions are
"applicable to the determination of questions of fact in all contradictory
judicial proceedings and in proceedings to confirm a default. ' 22° In listed
proceedings, such as workers' compensation hearings and child custody
matters, the Code is of limited applicability. The principles underlying
the provision serve in these proceedings as general guides to the ad-
missibility of evidence, but with specific exclusionary rules applicable
only to the extent that they "tend to promote the purposes of the
proceedings."
221
216. Article 1002 applies only when the proponent seeks "[t]o prove the content of"
the writing, etc., and not when it is used for other purposes, such as to compare handwriting
or typeface. See id. art. 1002 comment (b).
217. The exceptions are: when authenticity of the original is in doubt; when it would
be unfair not to use the original; and when the original is a testament to be probated,
is a contract on which the claim or defense is based, or is otherwise closely related to
a controlling issue. See La. Code Evid. art. 1003 comments.
218. See, e.g., Harrison v. Occhipinti, 251 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
219. Article 1005 creates an exception to the requirement of the original for public
records. Article 1006 permits the introduction of summaries of voluminous materials.
Article 1007 permits the proving of contents by the admissions of the adverse party. And
article 1008, in detailing the functions of judge and jury as to evidence of contents,
represents a specialized application of the rules of article 104(A) and (B). See generally
La. Code Evid. arts. 1005-08 comments.
220. La. Code Evid. art. 1101(A). This phraseology is technically imperfect in that it
does not seem to embrace article 202 on judicial notice of legal matters. In proceedings
to confirm a default there will be no opposing counsel to interpose objections, so en-
forcement of the evidentiary rules is left to the presiding judge.
221. Id. art. 1101(B). Those familiar with practice in the enumerated proceedings and
hearings will recognize that this language, while somewhat vague and uncertain on its
face, simply codifies rather than changes the former practice.
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Paragraph 1101(D) covers the discretionary applicability of the Code.
It permits any court, even in proceedings in which the Code is of limited
applicability under paragraph (B) or is generally inapplicable under par-
agraph (C), to look to the provisions governing judicial notice, authen-
tication, or contents of writings as an aid to admitting evidence or
determining a fact. The intent was not to bind judges in those proceedings
to the requirements of Chapters Two, Nine, and Ten, but rather to
permit them to employ the provisions of those chapters to the extent
they may prove helpful.
Article 1103 was added during the last-minute compromise meeting
held on the evening before the Code went to the Senate Committee. It
was intended to guard against the risk-created by the deletion of
paragraph (C) from article 404 of the Law Institute's Proposed Code222 -
that article 104 would be construed as eviscerating the protections of
prior case law concerning the admissibility of "other crimes" evidence
against the criminally accused. 223
Conclusion
The long-awaited Code of Evidence offers a welcomed and much
needed organization and modernization of Louisiana's heretofore scat-
tered and uncertain evidence law. Initially, lawyers who are very familiar
with federal court practice will find the new Code easier to work with
than lawyers whose practice has been exclusively in state courts, for the
new Code was generally modelled after the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Following the federal pattern enables Louisiana to utilize national case
law and treatises as a guide to interpreting those provisions that are
identical or similar to the federal model. In a short time, this advantage
as well as the clarity and organization of the new Code will win the
acceptance of those previously unfamiliar with its style and content.
Moreover, since the proper objection and the appropriate judicial ruling
will usually be the same as under former law, the change will not be
dramatic.
It is unfortunate that in the process of revision and codification
more meaningful reforms could not have been effected in several areas
of our evidence law. But the new Code was born amid conflict and
disagreement and is necessarily a child of compromise. Despite its im-
perfections, it is an immeasurable improvement over the unstructured
and uncertain prior law. And, as always, the opportunity for other
needed reforms should be viewed not as lost, but as merely postponed.
222. Proposed La. Code Evid. art. 404(C). See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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